| Naples and Mount Vesuvius |
Back in the 1980s, when the issue of the safety of residents living in the Vesuvian plain in the event of an eruption was concretely raised, it was highlighted that there were no remedies capable of offering adequate physical protection to inhabitants against highly lethal phenomena such as terrifying pyroclastic flows. Composed of volcanic gases, water vapor, ash, pumice, and fragments of magma and rock abraded from the volcanic conduit, pyroclastic flows form following the collapse of the eruptive column. After blasting tens of kilometers high into the atmosphere, once its upward thrust is exhausted, the column collapses back down, generating scorching avalanches that race rapidly down the flanks of the volcano, traveling considerable distances with a turbulent and destructive motion.
It was precisely pyroclastic flows that characterized the deadly Plinian eruption that tragically engulfed the towns of Pompeii and Herculaneum in 79 AD. In that eruption, the Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI 5) was catastrophic, forming an eruptive column exceeding thirty kilometers in height before collapsing onto itself and generating multiple waves of pyroclastic flows at different intervals that surged downslope, striking towns located at the base of the volcano. Herculaneum was among the first to be hit and destroyed, with flow temperatures exceeding 400 °C and speeds of over 100 km/h.
The scorching clouds that struck Herculaneum were particularly lethal; when they overwhelmed the residents who delayed evacuating by taking shelter along the shoreline inside boat chambers, they brought instantaneous death. On several human remains, in fact, one can observe the "bursting" of the skull caused by the sudden boiling and vaporization of bodily fluids, as well as limbs fractured by thermal shock and reddish bones stained by the thermal decomposition of hemoglobin in the blood...
In a broader discussion on habitability in the Vesuvian area, one must keep firmly in mind that it is impossible to predict with guaranteed useful advance notice either the onset of an eruption or the magnitude that will characterize it—a power measured by a numerical index (VEI) that can generally be quantified with reasonable accuracy only after the eruption has ended.
Faced with these two major uncertainties, the level of risk looming over Vesuvian populations is inevitably far from minimal. Every narrative about the heroic resilience of exposed communities is actually built upon the lack of sensory perception of danger and the belief that an eruption can certainly be predicted at least 72 hours in advance, as government information campaigns have long claimed—even though today those tones of predictive certainty have grown rather timid, shifting responsibility onto the Event Tree: a software tool designed to rapidly analyze volcanic monitoring data.
Eighty-two years have passed since the last eruption of Vesuvius (1944), meaning we are approaching a full century of quiescence. A century-long or multi-century quiescence of Vesuvius would not disproportionately worsen the risk factors already inherent inside the current Red Zone, yet it would certainly affect the extent of the hazard area, which could quadruple to encompass zones currently considered safe. Scientific literature indeed states that the Volcanic Explosivity Index tends to rise as periods of geological repose lengthen.
Scientists of the Major Risks Commission (Commissione Grandi Rischi), also drawing on the report produced by a dedicated working group (2012), confirmed that the maximum expected reference eruption for drafting emergency plans at Vesuvius should be a sub-Plinian VEI 4 event. Consequently, the Red Zone was delineated taking into account the work of researcher Lucia Gurioli, who verified in the field and plotted on a map (the Black Line) the maximum runout points of the pyroclastic flows formed during the last sub-Plinian eruption of 1631.
Not everyone knows this curved demarcation line, and almost everyone misinterprets it as a safety boundary; in reality, it is merely a deposit limit that fails to account for the advance of the lighter, dilute gaseous surges of a pyroclastic cloud. Moreover, it must be clear that photocopy eruptions do not exist, and the energy released by a volcano can also be represented by decimal figures: for example, VEI 4.2. Such a value corresponds to an energy release twice as great as a VEI 4.0 eruption; an example of intermediate explosivity is offered by the powerful Pollena eruption of 472 AD, whose eruptive style cannot be boxed into a round number and sits between VEI 4 and VEI 5—occurring 393 years after the catastrophic Pompeii eruption of 79 AD.
Should a VEI 4 eruption occur, pyroclastic flows could reach areas located roughly 7–10 km from the crater. Conversely, if the eruption were to reach VEI 5 (Plinian) energy levels—ten times stronger than the benchmark VEI 4 event—pyroclastic flows could travel 15 to 20 kilometers from the eruptive vent. This projection highlights that, with current criteria, disaster prevention faces critical flaws that should at least be disclosed to the public, especially if immediate or medium-term protective measures cannot be guaranteed.
In the event of a volcanic alert, the area subject to preventive evacuation is effectively the VEI 4 zone—the red circle shown in the diagram below, covering roughly 200 square kilometers. By contrast, the concentric ring colored in green to distinguish it clearly indicates an area of approximately 800 square kilometers that could be overrun by pyroclastic flows during a Plinian eruption (VEI 5). This eruptive style carries the concrete probability that scorching clouds will breach the VEI 4 perimeter and push outward to distances of 15–20 kilometers...
In short, a Plinian eruption would engulf a total territory of over 1,000 square kilometers inhabited by several million people. Yet a Plinian eruption has been completely excluded from plausible scenarios... To be even clearer, there is no evacuation plan or directive covering the VEI 5 Green Zone. Thus, residents living within this belt would remain stationary during an alert, watching nature’s extraordinary spectacle without even realizing that their lives are entrusted to statistical calculations that shift over time—even within a matter of hours—and not in a linear fashion.
Within volcanic risk philosophies characterized by multiple factors of indeterminacy, the decision to disregard a Plinian eruption is inevitably indefensible from an ethical standpoint and remains a gamble. The fundamental right to safety dictates that where protection is absent or impossible, there must at least be accurate, timely public information—which is currently lacking. Authorities should state clearly: "Dear citizens, there is no evacuation plan for a Plinian eruption, which remains statistically unlikely. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out deterministically because, according to experts, the statistical probability of a Plinian event materializing at Vesuvius ranges from 1% to 11%, depending on the time-window table adopted, both of which are based on different quiescence periods of the volcano. The reference table selected by the Major Risks Commission is Table B."
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| Statistical tables showing eruptive style probabilities. Tables A and B of eruptive probabilities. |
The Major Risks Commission assumed the responsibility of adopting a low-to-medium reference eruption (VEI 4), just as the Vesuvius Observatory and the Civil Protection Department assumed the burden of forecasting by declaring that magma movements are constantly monitored and therefore an eruption cannot catch us by surprise... Finally, let us remember that it will always be the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, after consulting the Major Risks Commission and the Civil Protection Operational Committee, that issues the evacuation order for the Vesuvius Red Zone when necessary.
For departmental and regional experts, 72 hours—corresponding to three days' advance notice before the eruption—are deemed sufficient to evacuate the 700,000 inhabitants of the Red Zone. Objectively, such a number of residents is not easily manageable, given that it exceeds the population of a major city like Palermo. Even from a population density standpoint, several Vesuvian municipalities—especially along the coast—record staggering figures, such as the town of Portici with roughly 11,350 inhabitants per square kilometer: a level of crowding that certainly does not help...
Evacuation procedures stipulate that the 700,000 Vesuvian residents be relocated, in the event of a volcanic alert, across all Italian regions and provinces, islands included. Rapid evacuation modes include ships, trains, buses, and private cars. It must be remembered that to board ships and trains, evacuees must first reach ports and railway stations via collective transport (buses).
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| Chart illustrating twinning arrangements between Vesuvian municipalities and Italian regions. Twinning scheme. |
Another unknown in analyzing this volcanic territory concerns the aftermath of the eruption—a phenomenon that can last from a few days to several weeks. Once the acute explosive phase has passed, it cannot be ruled out that the 700,000 evacuees will one way or another seek to return to their homes to assess the damage suffered and understand how the State intends to compensate those who sustained severe losses or lost everything—illegal builders included (Ischia docet).
In any case, even if the eruption were to subside within a few days, ruins would scar the Vesuvian landscape, prompting belated reflections on the mistakes made in land management and on the prevention policies implemented—and above all not implemented—to prevent a natural event from turning into a volcanic catastrophe. According to common sense, the next eruption of Vesuvius will empirically redraw the new Red Zone. Buildings swept away by pyroclastic flows or lava flows will most likely not be rebuilt and will delineate the new Red Zone, just as disputes over property boundary lines are guaranteed to arise. Only an eruption similar to the 1944 event (VEI 3) would allow moderate optimism regarding the economic and social recovery timelines of the Vesuvian area—and even then, not immediately.
Among recent initiatives, the Municipality of Pompei has signed onto the memorandum of understanding promoted by the Convivenza Vesuvio Foundation—a project aiming to evacuate Vesuvian residents to municipalities in the Apennine and pre-Apennine belt of Irpinia should the volcano show signs of renewed eruptive activity. The underlying principle is irrefutable, as it would prevent displaced citizens from scattering across distant Italian regions, keeping them within Campania. However, from what little is known, the project seems to contain more statements of principle than concrete operational procedures. Given the vital importance of these issues for citizens, clear answers and guarantees are required.
Indeed, since the early 1950s, the Apennine and pre-Apennine areas have experienced steady depopulation driven by a mix of declining birth rates, lack of jobs, and scarce services and infrastructure, triggering long-term emigration toward coastal provinces, northern Italy, or abroad—especially among young people reluctant to accept limited opportunities for education, leisure, and employment. The housing stock needed for the Convivenza project is not located in major urban centers, but in small towns scattered across the provinces of Avellino and Benevento. The Convivenza Vesuvio initiative could harbor seeds of failure, because Vesuvian residents might accept a "brick-and-mortar tent" temporarily, without ever viewing it as a permanent home worthy of personal investment; their thoughts will always turn back to their historic hometowns...
Finally, we wish to conclude by highlighting two points we consider crucial: the first concerns the green belt labeled VEI 5 in our earlier diagram. That drawing highlights in a color usually associated with normality a territory that is anything but normal—an area that pyroclastic flows can overrun during a Plinian eruption, yet which is omitted from any emergency or evacuation plan. Nonetheless, this zone—which sooner or later will inevitably demand attention—is not governed by any national or regional law, regulation, circular, or recommendation acknowledging its Plinian hazard status. Yet the precautionary principle, even amidst scientific uncertainty, demands prioritizing long-term prevention to safeguard future generations who bear no blame for the territorial layout they inherit. The Green Zone should probably already be designated today as a Yellow Zone (attention) or a Regulated Zone (zona regolamentata), preventing the rise of high-density residential complexes with tall buildings.
Meanwhile, the Plinian VEI 5 area is undergoing relentless urbanization and human settlement, partly because it is called upon to absorb the housing demand displaced from the classic Red Zone, where a total ban on new residential building applies (Regional Law 21/2003). This means that when experts eventually bring the Plinian risk back onto the table—whether due to elapsed geological time, a renewed culture of prevention, groundbreaking scientific discoveries, or updated statistical models—we will be confronted with chaotically overbuilt land offering virtually no margin for structural adaptation along the lines of passive defense, wide roadways, low-rise buildings, and above all open spaces: vast open spaces without which no Civil Protection policy can ever function...
The President of the Campania Region, together with the Civil Protection Department, should bring together scientific and urban planning experts to evaluate the consequences of a VEI 5 eruption in accordance with the precautionary principle and Generational Impact Assessment (GIA) (Valutazione di Impatto Generazionale - VIG). Within the VEI 5 belt, a Regulated Zone status must be enacted so that land governance incorporates strategic planning and management requirements with an eye toward future generations.
The President of the Campania Region should also thoroughly verify the feasibility assumptions underlying the Convivenza Vesuvio Foundation’s project, because expectations of remaining within Campania during a volcanic emergency cannot be raised unless every aspect—from administrative and economic frameworks to the actual census of available housing—has been rigorously verified.
Vincenzo Savarese (MalKo)





