![]() |
| A glimpse of the Gulf of Sorrento overlooking Mount Vesuvius. Photo taken from Vico Equense. |
A few years ago, in order to draft emergency plans for the risk
posed by Mount Vesuvius, it was necessary to probabilistically determine the
type of event that will characterize its future eruption. The eruptive scenario
established by scientists was a sub-Plinian VEI 4 event, excluding a Plinian
eruption (VEI 5) from the roster of events considered statistically plausible
for the next century.
Warner Marzocchi, geophysicist, former INGV researcher, and
currently professor at the University of Naples, provided the
mathematical-statistical tool known as BET (Bayesian Event Tree), used to
evaluate the evolution of complex systems and estimate the probability of
future eruptive events through continuously updated monitoring data. The
professor reached the conclusion that, in probabilistic terms, the maximum
reference eruption for Vesuvius could indeed be confirmed as a sub-Plinian VEI
4. The results emerging from the working groups—considering a time window based
on a quiescence period of 60 to 200 years—assigned the Plinian event a 1%
probability of occurring. At the same time, however, within the exact same
calculations adopting a different timeframe—still based on a minimum quiescence
limit of 60 years, but this time without an upper limit—the Plinian eruption
emerged as an eruptive style with an 11% probability (see table).

It must be remembered that the extent of the Red Zone—that is, the
area threatened by the spread of pyroclastic flows—is strictly tied to the
intensity of the eruption, and therefore to the height of the eruptive column,
which is a crucial factor that enormously influences the horizontal distances
traveled by scorching currents.
![]() |
The final choice of the eruptive scenario fell to the Major Risks
Commission (Commissione Grandi Rischi - CGR), which, after the necessary
debates, adopted and proposed Marzocchi’s statistical calculation to
departmental leaders, locking it in. High-ranking officials and politicians did
the same, accepting with relief the sub-Plinian VEI 4 eruption as the maximum
expected eruptive event at Vesuvius. It was upon this conclusion that safety
strategies were subsequently built, all feeding into the drafting of the
National Emergency Plan and its corresponding evacuation plan. The sub-Plinian
decision was immediately adopted by the Campania Region (under President
Stefano Caldoro), which was thus not required to extend the construction ban
(Regional Law 21/2003) beyond the borders of the old Red Zone—borders that
today have been widened at the expense of fairness, in a zoning process that
has at times been fraught with inequity...
From a technical standpoint, the Vesuvius Emergency Plan is a plan
that does not envision operations during an ongoing eruption or hazards
different from and greater than the main one: the evacuation plan, therefore,
is the emergency plan itself.
Political and institutional leaders immediately seized upon the
conclusions of Marzocchi and his colleagues: Table B was deemed suitable for
protection needs over the next century and for at least 2–3 generations. The
possibility of a catastrophic eruption like that of Pompeii in 79 AD
materializing was deemed residual and therefore ignorable. That numerical
figure of 1% allowed the Civil Protection Department, once the worst-case
scenario was shelved, to draft an emergency plan characterized by operational
solutions based on elementary arithmetic. The underlying philosophy emerging
among decision-makers—which is now law—is to focus on the maximum credible
event rather than the maximum possible event.
The Major Risks Commission operates by meeting behind open doors to
hear all stakeholders, and then behind closed doors without the public to
discuss and broadly deliberate on the most delicate conclusions. This means
that the full debates among scientists remain unknown—and hard to find in
print—under confidentiality protocols that are not always understandable and
are perhaps deeply conditioned by the legal aftermath of the 2009 L'Aquila
earthquake.
From our perspective, this methodology of secrecy creates a
significant democratic and institutional problem. When scientific decisions
have such a profound impact on public safety and urban planning, the dividing
line between pure technical advice and political decision-making becomes
razor-thin. The scientists mentioned below formalized an opinion based on the
probability deemed most "reasonable" in the medium term, carrying
with it the undeniable practical effect of lightening an otherwise overwhelmingly
complex planning burden.
This choice of the VEI 4 eruptive style sounded appealing to both
the technical and political institutional sectors because it allowed them to
overlook the greater danger, which otherwise would have required including the
entire city of Naples in evacuation planning—along with everything that
entailed in terms of extending the ban on residential construction. This latter
point is the real concern, generally speaking, of public administrators, given
that the potential for a volcanic catastrophe during times of geological peace
is not perceived by the senses, and thus remains mere talk without adrenaline.
The Major Risks Commission that convened to establish the reference
eruption comprised experts of the highest caliber:
-
Prof. Vincenzo Morra (Sector
Coordinator): Full Professor of Petrology and Petrography and Director of the
Department of Earth Sciences at the "Federico II" University of
Naples.
-
Prof. Lucia Civetta: Full
Professor of Geochemistry and Volcanology at "Federico II" and former
Director of the Vesuvius Observatory.
-
Prof. Pierfrancesco Dellino:
Full Professor of Volcanology and Geochemistry at the University of Bari and
Director of the Research Center on Seismic and Volcanic Risk.
-
Prof. Massimo Coltorti: Full
Professor of Petrology and Petrography at the University of Ferrara.
-
Prof. Rosanna De Rosa: Full
Professor of Geochemistry and Volcanology at the University of Calabria.
These academics, together with geophysicist Marzocchi, placed on
record—also on the basis of the report "Eruptive Scenarios and Alert
Levels for Vesuvius" signed by working group leader Giovanni Macedonio and
Vesuvius Observatory director Marcello Martini—their conclusions on what the
maximum future eruption of Vesuvius should be. Ultimately, their consensus
converged on the fact that the theoretically accepted event (VEI 4) covered
almost the entirety of cumulative statistical probabilities of occurrence, leaving
out only the Plinian VEI 5 eruption.
It should be clarified that science does not establish volcanic risk
levels through legislative acts: science alone does not become law, limiting
its role to an advisory function—albeit of the highest order—which must always
be taken into account. It is politics—and specifically the Presidency of the
Council of Ministers and the Civil Protection Department—that decides, based on
the scientific guidance received, the level of risk acceptable to our society,
especially when the intensity of the hazard under examination can grow
exponentially.
The national political arm of this operation was Undersecretary to
the Presidency of the Council (Guido Bertolaso), former Head of the Civil
Protection Department. Faced with objections from independent volcanologists
such as Giuseppe Mastrolorenzo, who disagreed with removing the Plinian
eruptive type from the calculation of plausible occurrences, Bertolaso not only
refused to revisit the issue, but made no secret of his hostility toward the
critic, threatening him with legal action for causing public alarm.
Undersecretary Bertolaso defended the sub-Plinian model (then
calibrated on the 1631 eruption), rejecting the inclusion of a Plinian scenario
in emergency frameworks because planning for such an event could be considered
an unfeasible "book of dreams," as it would have paralyzed Campania
by inevitably forcing the inclusion of Naples in emergency planning. The gist
of his position was reportedly as follows: "The State cannot plan
emergencies based on zero risk or on the absolute worst-case scenario (the Plinian
eruption). We must focus on the logistical feasibility of regional twinning
arrangements for the sub-Plinian event. If nature shows stronger signals, we
will manage the expansion of the emergency as it unfolds, but cold-phase
planning must remain confined to what is manageable."
Franco Gabrielli (Prefect, Head of Civil Protection 2010–2015) took
part in locking in this regulatory framework, endorsing Marzocchi’s 1% figure
and harshly dismissing scientific and technical criticisms. Regarding
dissenters on the Plinian scenario, he stated: "We do not know when
Vesuvius will erupt, but the National Emergency Plan must be based on criteria
of stringent scientific rationality. Too often, instead, in this country people
talk about these systems and volcanic risk as if they were chatting at a sports
bar."
The Director of the Emergency Office of the Civil Protection
Department also advanced the same argument, even invoking an asteroid impact:
"If we had to plan for every theoretically possible event on Earth, then I
would also want a national emergency plan for an asteroid impact. But I don't
have one, because Civil Protection must plan for credible and manageable
scenarios, not for total catastrophes that would wipe out any possibility of
intervention."
Edoardo Cosenza, engineer and university professor of structural
engineering, served as Regional Councilor for Civil Protection in Campania
during the period of these key decisions, helping to endorse the VEI 4 scenario
and dismissing the threat of a Pompeii-style eruption (VEI 5) with a famous
quip along the same lines as his colleagues: "If we had to calculate and
take into account the great catastrophes of the past, then we would also have
to evaluate the Great Flood." On another occasion he added: "And there
would be problems for everyone whose name isn't Noah..."
After assessing that a VEI 4 eruption was rated as the maximum
plausible hazard, the Major Risks Commission established that the boundaries of
the danger zone—where pyroclastic flows could spread—could be represented by
the Gurioli black curved line. This line traced the deposit limits of products
from past sub-Plinian eruptions. The Commission's recommendation was to extend
these boundaries wherever possible: abundans cautela non nocet (abundant
caution does no harm). Any municipality crossed even marginally by the black
line was placed in its entirety on the Red Zone list. For these "new
entry" municipalities, mediation by the Regional Councilor for Civil
Protection was therefore necessary to define which portions of territory the
crossed municipalities were willing to cede to the Red Zone ban on residential
construction.
Engineer Cosenza was among the chief architects of the new Red Zone
perimeter, initiating genuine negotiations with several municipalities,
including Poggiomarino and Scafati. Poggiomarino was even tempted to push back
the Gurioli black line in order to free its entire territory from anti-concrete
restrictions. The Mayor of Scafati, meanwhile, stated: "The new Vesuvius
Emergency Plan approved by Civil Protection risks creating urban planning
problems for our territory." Faced with municipal hesitation, Cosenza
threatened to classify the entire territory of both municipalities as
unbuildable if they did not quickly decide which portions of land they were
willing to sacrifice on the altar of expanding Red Zone 1. In the end,
Poggiomarino ceded a few patches of agricultural land, and Scafati ceded
nothing.
It must be said that the statements of the institutional figures
cited above are not always acceptable from the standpoint of protecting exposed
populations. Instead, the underlying principle that emerged from volcanic
hazard containment policies is that emergency planning must be sized around an
intervention model calibrated on the most probable scenario or the maximum
credible event, rather than the maximum known historical event, in order to
make emergency procedures practically applicable, a principle forming the
backbone of modern Italian Civil Protection doctrine, along the lines of
"saving what can be saved." However, it must be pointed out that
Prof. Marzocchi's mathematical model is a dynamic and flexible tool, whereas
political authorities took his statistical outputs and statically
"locked" them into the National Emergency Plan. Politics thus
crystallized the VEI 4 (sub-Plinian) scenario into an immutable administrative
dogma, ignoring the fluid nature of the scientific model.
The major underlying problem remains that this operational philosophy, so determined and even bold, has shown political asymmetry, timidity, and stammering when it comes to preventing a volcanic catastrophe. All that ironclad determination used to lock in the evacuation plan around a maximum VEI 4 hypothesis vanishes when moving to prevention policies, which have the flaw of yielding no returns in terms of votes and electoral consensus. We will analyze the current Red Zone in the next article...
Vincenzo Savarese (MalKo)



Nessun commento:
Posta un commento
I commenti sono moderati dall'autore prima della pubblicazione. Non sono ammessi link pubblicitari o esterni.