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sabato 4 luglio 2026

Vesuvius Hazard: Why Does the Emergency Plan Exclude a Plinian Eruption?

 

A glimpse of the Gulf of Sorrento overlooking Mount Vesuvius.
Photo taken from Vico Equense.


A few years ago, in order to draft emergency plans for the risk posed by Mount Vesuvius, it was necessary to probabilistically determine the type of event that will characterize its future eruption. The eruptive scenario established by scientists was a sub-Plinian VEI 4 event, excluding a Plinian eruption (VEI 5) from the roster of events considered statistically plausible for the next century.

Warner Marzocchi, geophysicist, former INGV researcher, and currently professor at the University of Naples, provided the mathematical-statistical tool known as BET (Bayesian Event Tree), used to evaluate the evolution of complex systems and estimate the probability of future eruptive events through continuously updated monitoring data. The professor reached the conclusion that, in probabilistic terms, the maximum reference eruption for Vesuvius could indeed be confirmed as a sub-Plinian VEI 4. The results emerging from the working groups—considering a time window based on a quiescence period of 60 to 200 years—assigned the Plinian event a 1% probability of occurring. At the same time, however, within the exact same calculations adopting a different timeframe—still based on a minimum quiescence limit of 60 years, but this time without an upper limit—the Plinian eruption emerged as an eruptive style with an 11% probability (see table).


It must be remembered that the extent of the Red Zone—that is, the area threatened by the spread of pyroclastic flows—is strictly tied to the intensity of the eruption, and therefore to the height of the eruptive column, which is a crucial factor that enormously influences the horizontal distances traveled by scorching currents.

The final choice of the eruptive scenario fell to the Major Risks Commission (Commissione Grandi Rischi - CGR), which, after the necessary debates, adopted and proposed Marzocchi’s statistical calculation to departmental leaders, locking it in. High-ranking officials and politicians did the same, accepting with relief the sub-Plinian VEI 4 eruption as the maximum expected eruptive event at Vesuvius. It was upon this conclusion that safety strategies were subsequently built, all feeding into the drafting of the National Emergency Plan and its corresponding evacuation plan. The sub-Plinian decision was immediately adopted by the Campania Region (under President Stefano Caldoro), which was thus not required to extend the construction ban (Regional Law 21/2003) beyond the borders of the old Red Zone—borders that today have been widened at the expense of fairness, in a zoning process that has at times been fraught with inequity...

From a technical standpoint, the Vesuvius Emergency Plan is a plan that does not envision operations during an ongoing eruption or hazards different from and greater than the main one: the evacuation plan, therefore, is the emergency plan itself.

Political and institutional leaders immediately seized upon the conclusions of Marzocchi and his colleagues: Table B was deemed suitable for protection needs over the next century and for at least 2–3 generations. The possibility of a catastrophic eruption like that of Pompeii in 79 AD materializing was deemed residual and therefore ignorable. That numerical figure of 1% allowed the Civil Protection Department, once the worst-case scenario was shelved, to draft an emergency plan characterized by operational solutions based on elementary arithmetic. The underlying philosophy emerging among decision-makers—which is now law—is to focus on the maximum credible event rather than the maximum possible event.

The Major Risks Commission operates by meeting behind open doors to hear all stakeholders, and then behind closed doors without the public to discuss and broadly deliberate on the most delicate conclusions. This means that the full debates among scientists remain unknown—and hard to find in print—under confidentiality protocols that are not always understandable and are perhaps deeply conditioned by the legal aftermath of the 2009 L'Aquila earthquake.

From our perspective, this methodology of secrecy creates a significant democratic and institutional problem. When scientific decisions have such a profound impact on public safety and urban planning, the dividing line between pure technical advice and political decision-making becomes razor-thin. The scientists mentioned below formalized an opinion based on the probability deemed most "reasonable" in the medium term, carrying with it the undeniable practical effect of lightening an otherwise overwhelmingly complex planning burden.

This choice of the VEI 4 eruptive style sounded appealing to both the technical and political institutional sectors because it allowed them to overlook the greater danger, which otherwise would have required including the entire city of Naples in evacuation planning—along with everything that entailed in terms of extending the ban on residential construction. This latter point is the real concern, generally speaking, of public administrators, given that the potential for a volcanic catastrophe during times of geological peace is not perceived by the senses, and thus remains mere talk without adrenaline.

The Major Risks Commission that convened to establish the reference eruption comprised experts of the highest caliber:

-        Prof. Vincenzo Morra (Sector Coordinator): Full Professor of Petrology and Petrography and Director of the Department of Earth Sciences at the "Federico II" University of Naples.

-        Prof. Lucia Civetta: Full Professor of Geochemistry and Volcanology at "Federico II" and former Director of the Vesuvius Observatory.

-        Prof. Pierfrancesco Dellino: Full Professor of Volcanology and Geochemistry at the University of Bari and Director of the Research Center on Seismic and Volcanic Risk.

-        Prof. Massimo Coltorti: Full Professor of Petrology and Petrography at the University of Ferrara.

-        Prof. Rosanna De Rosa: Full Professor of Geochemistry and Volcanology at the University of Calabria.

These academics, together with geophysicist Marzocchi, placed on record—also on the basis of the report "Eruptive Scenarios and Alert Levels for Vesuvius" signed by working group leader Giovanni Macedonio and Vesuvius Observatory director Marcello Martini—their conclusions on what the maximum future eruption of Vesuvius should be. Ultimately, their consensus converged on the fact that the theoretically accepted event (VEI 4) covered almost the entirety of cumulative statistical probabilities of occurrence, leaving out only the Plinian VEI 5 eruption.

It should be clarified that science does not establish volcanic risk levels through legislative acts: science alone does not become law, limiting its role to an advisory function—albeit of the highest order—which must always be taken into account. It is politics—and specifically the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the Civil Protection Department—that decides, based on the scientific guidance received, the level of risk acceptable to our society, especially when the intensity of the hazard under examination can grow exponentially.

The national political arm of this operation was Undersecretary to the Presidency of the Council (Guido Bertolaso), former Head of the Civil Protection Department. Faced with objections from independent volcanologists such as Giuseppe Mastrolorenzo, who disagreed with removing the Plinian eruptive type from the calculation of plausible occurrences, Bertolaso not only refused to revisit the issue, but made no secret of his hostility toward the critic, threatening him with legal action for causing public alarm.

Undersecretary Bertolaso defended the sub-Plinian model (then calibrated on the 1631 eruption), rejecting the inclusion of a Plinian scenario in emergency frameworks because planning for such an event could be considered an unfeasible "book of dreams," as it would have paralyzed Campania by inevitably forcing the inclusion of Naples in emergency planning. The gist of his position was reportedly as follows: "The State cannot plan emergencies based on zero risk or on the absolute worst-case scenario (the Plinian eruption). We must focus on the logistical feasibility of regional twinning arrangements for the sub-Plinian event. If nature shows stronger signals, we will manage the expansion of the emergency as it unfolds, but cold-phase planning must remain confined to what is manageable."

Franco Gabrielli (Prefect, Head of Civil Protection 2010–2015) took part in locking in this regulatory framework, endorsing Marzocchi’s 1% figure and harshly dismissing scientific and technical criticisms. Regarding dissenters on the Plinian scenario, he stated: "We do not know when Vesuvius will erupt, but the National Emergency Plan must be based on criteria of stringent scientific rationality. Too often, instead, in this country people talk about these systems and volcanic risk as if they were chatting at a sports bar."

The Director of the Emergency Office of the Civil Protection Department also advanced the same argument, even invoking an asteroid impact: "If we had to plan for every theoretically possible event on Earth, then I would also want a national emergency plan for an asteroid impact. But I don't have one, because Civil Protection must plan for credible and manageable scenarios, not for total catastrophes that would wipe out any possibility of intervention."

Edoardo Cosenza, engineer and university professor of structural engineering, served as Regional Councilor for Civil Protection in Campania during the period of these key decisions, helping to endorse the VEI 4 scenario and dismissing the threat of a Pompeii-style eruption (VEI 5) with a famous quip along the same lines as his colleagues: "If we had to calculate and take into account the great catastrophes of the past, then we would also have to evaluate the Great Flood." On another occasion he added: "And there would be problems for everyone whose name isn't Noah..."

After assessing that a VEI 4 eruption was rated as the maximum plausible hazard, the Major Risks Commission established that the boundaries of the danger zone—where pyroclastic flows could spread—could be represented by the Gurioli black curved line. This line traced the deposit limits of products from past sub-Plinian eruptions. The Commission's recommendation was to extend these boundaries wherever possible: abundans cautela non nocet (abundant caution does no harm). Any municipality crossed even marginally by the black line was placed in its entirety on the Red Zone list. For these "new entry" municipalities, mediation by the Regional Councilor for Civil Protection was therefore necessary to define which portions of territory the crossed municipalities were willing to cede to the Red Zone ban on residential construction.

Engineer Cosenza was among the chief architects of the new Red Zone perimeter, initiating genuine negotiations with several municipalities, including Poggiomarino and Scafati. Poggiomarino was even tempted to push back the Gurioli black line in order to free its entire territory from anti-concrete restrictions. The Mayor of Scafati, meanwhile, stated: "The new Vesuvius Emergency Plan approved by Civil Protection risks creating urban planning problems for our territory." Faced with municipal hesitation, Cosenza threatened to classify the entire territory of both municipalities as unbuildable if they did not quickly decide which portions of land they were willing to sacrifice on the altar of expanding Red Zone 1. In the end, Poggiomarino ceded a few patches of agricultural land, and Scafati ceded nothing.

It must be said that the statements of the institutional figures cited above are not always acceptable from the standpoint of protecting exposed populations. Instead, the underlying principle that emerged from volcanic hazard containment policies is that emergency planning must be sized around an intervention model calibrated on the most probable scenario or the maximum credible event, rather than the maximum known historical event, in order to make emergency procedures practically applicable, a principle forming the backbone of modern Italian Civil Protection doctrine, along the lines of "saving what can be saved." However, it must be pointed out that Prof. Marzocchi's mathematical model is a dynamic and flexible tool, whereas political authorities took his statistical outputs and statically "locked" them into the National Emergency Plan. Politics thus crystallized the VEI 4 (sub-Plinian) scenario into an immutable administrative dogma, ignoring the fluid nature of the scientific model.

The major underlying problem remains that this operational philosophy, so determined and even bold, has shown political asymmetry, timidity, and stammering when it comes to preventing a volcanic catastrophe. All that ironclad determination used to lock in the evacuation plan around a maximum VEI 4 hypothesis vanishes when moving to prevention policies, which have the flaw of yielding no returns in terms of votes and electoral consensus. We will analyze the current Red Zone in the next article...

                                                                                    Vincenzo Savarese (MalKo)



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